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THE JAPANESE INITIATIVE: ABSOLUTE UNLIMITED
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL
CHAIRED BY JOSEPH J. ASSELTA AND LEE S. KREINDLER
PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Asselta: Good evening, I'm Joe Asselta and I welcome
you to this New York County Law Association forum. I
think we have prepared an exciting program. The topic:
the Japanese Initiative, Absolute Unlimited Liability in In-
ternational Air Travel.
First, I will give you a few words. Then, each of the advo-
cates presenting a position on the Initiative will speak. We
will start with the pro position, the con position, and the
alternate positions. Then we are going to have a brief re-
buttal, and I'll refer to these gentlemen as the advocates for
the positions known. Then we will have comments on these
positions by some distinguished spokesmen from the air-
craft builders, United States government, and insurers.
Time permitting, the advocates may then respond to their
critics and then take questions from whomever may offer
them.
Leading off will be George N. Tompkins, Jr. Many years
ago, when I was still in law school, George was already a
legend. His reputation as a litigator and defender of air-
lines was established worldwide. His defense of Warsaw
Editor's Note: Meeting of New York County Lawyers Association Evening Forum
held February 3, 1994. Speakers: George N. Tompkins, Jr., Esq., Lee S. Kreindler,
Esq., Warren L. Dean, Esq.; Comments: Airframe Manufacturers - Thomas J. Mc-
Laughlin, Esq., U.S. Government - Gary Allen, Esq., Insurers - Peter Magee, Esq.
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Convention' cases has taken him to more courts than any-
one I know, including two arguments in the United States
Supreme Court. That's not bad for a hockey player from
Canada who also dabbles in yacht litigation. George's views
of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreements,
although staunchly defensive, have been innovative, and he
has addressed them at a number of symposia.
Mr. Tompkins was an adviser to Japan Airlines (JAL) in
formulating the Japanese Initiative, whereby JAL waived all
applicable limitations of liability effective November 20,
1992, by a simple amendment to the conditions of carriage
for JAL. This brings up why we are here this evening. Be-
sides being a scratch golfer, George is a fellow of the Inter-
national Academy of Trial Lawyers and a member of their
board of directors. He is also a fellow in the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers. Thank you for being here, George,
I'm sure that you will come out swinging in a few minutes.
Following George, advocating the opposition to the Japa-
nese position will be my co-chair, Lee Kreindler. The name
Kreindler is so well known it is synonymous with aviation
law. Lee, with his father, were the pioneers on behalf of
plaintiffs in aviation accidents. Lee pursued his advocacy in
those early days when the deck was really stacked in favor of
the defendants. Largely through his efforts in the courts
and in the legislatures, this playing field has been leveled.
Lee is the author of Aviation Accident Law,2 which, as long as
I can recall, has been the treatise for those of us in the prac-
tice of aviation law. Lee is also a regular contributor to the
New York LawJournal, as well as numerous aviation sympo-
sia over the years.
Mr. Kreindler has been elected plaintiffs' lead counsel in
many major aviation lawsuits, the most recent being the Pan
Am 103, Lockerbie accident, in which the second circuit
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S., reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention,
Warsaw, or the Convention].
2 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION AccIDENT LAw (1963 & Supp. 1994).
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just approved the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.' I'm
sure you will hear more of this later.
Our third advocate, at the end, will take the position that
there must be alternatives to the Japanese Initiative and to-
tally open advocacy. Warren L. Dean, who is special coun-
sel to the Air Transport Association, will argue this position.
Warren Dean is a senior partner in the Washington, D.C.
law firm of Dyer, Ellis, Joseph & Mills. His practice includes
environmental, transportation, and general corporate law.
He also is an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown Law
Center, where he teaches international transportation law
in the graduate program.
Mr. Dean obtained law degrees from the University of
Maryland and from Georgetown, where he has his master's
of law in tax. He is contributing editor to the Oil Spill Law
Information Service Publishing Group. He has also au-
thored a number of articles on international law, including
Airlines Liability and International Air Transportation: Time For
a Change.4
Mr. Dean served as assistant general counsel for interna-
tional law at the Department of Transportation from 1983
until his departure in 1988. He previously held other posi-
tions in the general counsel's office of the Department of
Transportation, the Office of International Tax Counselors
of the Department of Treasury, and the Office of General
Counsel of the United States International Trade
Commission.
So with that, you have the advocates. Later we will hear
comments from the panel here. So George, lead it off.
Mr. Tompkins: Thank you very much, Joe.
My role tonight is to set the stage for the discussion that
will follow, so I intend to set a pretty active stage and then
sit back and enjoy the debate.
3 See In re Air Disater at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 709 F. Supp. 231
(J.P.M.L. 1989), aff'd, 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
4 Warren L. Dean, Jr., Airlines Liability and International Air Transportation: Time for
a Change, AIR & SPACE L., Winter 1989, at 1.
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The first thing I have to do is correct this title. I am not
pro the title of this discussion. The title is "The Japanese
Initiative: Absolute Unlimited Liability in International Air
Travel," and, if there is anything that the Japanese Initiative
is not, it is that. The Japanese Initiative is intended to bring
the Warsaw Convention liability regime back to what it orig-
inally was, which was fault liability. The Japanese Initiative
is not absolute liability, it is fault liability. So that is the first
surprise of the night, I am not pro absolute unlimited
liability.
The Japanese Initiative really does something very sim-
ple. It takes away, by amendment to the conditions of car-
riage, the limitation of liability provided by the Warsaw
Convention, the Hague Protocol,5 the Montreal Agree-
ment 6 or any other international treaty that may come
along covering passenger injury or death arising out of an
accident contemplated by Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion-for those passengers traveling with a Japanese airline
that has amended its conditions of carriage. The defenses
contained in Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention (herein-
after all references to specific numbered Articles are to Arti-
cles of the Warsaw Convention) are waived up to the limit
of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), but the Article 20
defenses are reinstated for any claim in excess of 100,000
SDR. The Japanese Initiative, therefore, brings the Warsaw
Convention system back to what it originally was designed
to be, which is a fault liability system.
In summary, Article 17 is still here. That is for the bene-
fit of the passenger. Article 20 is back for claims in excess
of 100,000 SDR and the Article 22 limit of liability is waived.
5 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage of Air, The Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371
[hereinafter Hauge, or the Hague Protocol]. The United States is not a party.
6 Additional Protocols 1-4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Pertaining to International Carriage by Air, Montreal, Sept. 25, 1975,
ICAO Docs. 9145, 9148 (not in force) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement, Montreal
Protocols, or the Protocols]. The United States Senate held hearings on these Pro-
tocols in 1977, 1981, and 1983. Although the Senate approved the Protocols on
March 19, 1983, by a vote of 50 to 42, the Protocols did not come into effect be-
cause the required two-thirds majority was not obtained.
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As a result, Article 3, as to ticket delivery, and Article 25, as
to willful misconduct, are no longer relevant if you are fly-
ing on a Japanese airline.
The question has arisen as to whether the reestablish-
ment of the Article 20 defenses, with respect to claims in
excess of 100,000 SDR, simply represents a return to the
original Warsaw Convention liability system and the attend-
ant litigation by passengers to break the liability limit, but
with a different limitation of liability on recoverable dam-
ages. The primary objective of the airline in waiving the
limitation of liability is to place the airline in a position
where it can negotiate settlements in excess of the applica-
ble Warsaw Convention limit of liability without requiring
the families of the passengers to engage in proof of Article
25 willful misconduct.
The primary purpose of the reinstatement of the Article
20 defenses with respect to claims in excess of 100,000 SDR
is to avoid claims by other potential third parties (i.e., man-
ufacturers and air traffic control facilities) that the airline,
by waiving the Warsaw Convention limitation of liability, be-
comes a volunteer and is not entitled to seek contribution
or indemnity from another responsible party. In an appro-
priate case, therefore, the airline will be in a position to
negotiate and conclude settlements with families of passen-
gers in excess of the Warsaw Convention limit without prej-
udice to claims for contribution and indemnity against
other potentially liable third parties. The contribution and
indemnity action need not, and should not, result in any
unnecessary delay in compensating passengers or their
families.
Thus, while the Japanese Initiative returns the Warsaw
Convention liability system to the original 1929 format, it is
the intention of the participating airlines not to invoke the
per passenger limitation of liability when negotiating settle-
ments but to preserve the right to do so in order to proceed
with contribution and indemnity claims against other re-
sponsible third parties. This should enable the participat-
ing airline, in an appropriate case, to reach an early
823
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agreement with other potentially responsible third parties
to share the overall liability for the passenger injuries or
deaths.
Let me raise a few other misunderstandings that may ex-
ist as to my personal position and views on the Warsaw Con-
vention. I am glad to see that Lee Wilcox has joined us
tonight. I do not think there is anybody here who can out-
rank Lee Wilcox in dealing with Warsaw Convention cases
in the history of the Convention. Also here, John Brennan,
Lee Kreindler and me, who were the three bad musketeers
from 1983 acknowledged in the Congressional Record
when Montreal Protocol 3 did not pass muster in the Sen-
ate.7 There has never been any doubt in my mind that the
Warsaw Convention must remain a part of the law of the
United States. That the Warsaw Convention remain a part
of United States law is absoluteley essential in international
aviation.
The problem has always been the passenger limit of lia-
bility-it was a problem in the late 1940s when Jane Fro-
man was injured in a crash in the Bay of Lisbon' and has
been a problem ever since-and all of the attention of the
United States has been directed to raising the limit of liabil-
ity. In the same time frame, every state in the United States
has done away with limitations of liability on recoverable
damages, and the airlines have grown to the economic
powerhouses they are today, despite what we read in the
Wall Street Journal. Does continuing to push for a limit of
liability internationally make sense? Why?
The Warsaw Convention is a good international private
law. How many people understand what it really is-a
choice of law rule? The Convention does not create any
rights between nations. The Convention confers rights on
passengers, confers rights on the users of air transport, and
confers obligations on airlines. The Convention tells you
when you can sue, when the convention applies, why you
7 129 CONG. REc. 4133-4147 (1983).
8 See Froman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1961), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947 (1955); Froman v. United States, 157 Ct. CI. 661 (1962).
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can sue, where you can sue, whom you can sue, how much
you can recover, and the time frame within which you must
sue. The one thing that is probably least susceptible to in-
ternational uniformity is personal injury or death damages.
You cannot, in common sense or logic, have an interna-
tional uniform limit of liability on recoverable damages.
Every country is different. Twenty-five thousand dollars was
an awful lot of money in damages in the United States in
the 1950s. Today the average award runs as high as
$1,500,000. We have seen that since 1966 awards have
grown from $30,000 to close to $800,000 in Japan where
there is no limitation applicable.
So why do we continue to push for a limitation in the
United States? Obviously the people in Japan got tired of
waiting for some international change, and what did they
do? They studied the Convention and, lo and behold,
there in Article 22 is found a provision that says the passen-
ger and carrier can agree to a higher limit of liability.
Without running afoul of the treaty we can just say no limit,
which is what the airlines of Japan did. A very simple solu-
tion. All of the attacks on the Warsaw Convention in this
country and the protracted litigation that so many people
complain about have been because of the Convention limi-
tation of liability. All you have to do is punch the aviation
cases out on a computer and look at the number of Warsaw
Convention cases. All of the efforts at the federal level have
been to preserve the concept of the limitation of liability
while increasing the limit to the great sum of 100,000 SDR
($135,000) requiring the passenger to pay for additional in-
surance coverage.
Airlines today can buy as much as $1.5 billion in coverage
for any one accident from their insurance carriers. The
coverage already is in place. No airline in the United States
that I am aware of buys liability insurance on the belief or
premise that a limitation is going to apply in the event of an
accident. So why should the government down in Washing-
ton be telling us we are going to limit liability to this new
limit of 100,000 SDR, but you can have extra protection if
825
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you pay $2, $3, $4 or $5 a ticket? The cost of insurance, as
purchased by airlines today, is probably less than one tenth
of one cent for each dollar in the ticket price, and that is
for coverage of $1.5 billion per accident. There is another
way the United States can address the problem.
If the U.S. carriers do not want to follow the Japanese
Initiative, and I urge that they should, as should all the car-
riers in the world, because it is the simple solution - in the
United States there is an even simpler solution, which I
have believed to be valid for many, many years. Simply
amend the Federal Aviation Act of 19581 to provide that the
limits of liability will not apply in the United States. Now
people say that would breach the treaty, but why? The War-
saw Convention is a private law treaty, not a public law
treaty. Is Australia in breach of the treaty because two
weeks ago one of their judges said that the United States
Supreme Court was flawed? Their reasoning was contrary
to the intent of the parties of the treaty. Does that mean
Australia is breaching the treaty? Of course not. The Con-
vention is a choice of law treaty, much like the restatement
of the law. You can adopt it as it is, or change it to suit your
own state, but you are not in breach of the treaty because
you do so.
There are no public rights that derive under the Warsaw
Convention, as there are under the Chicago Convention. 0
All they have to do in the Senate is sign a one-sentence
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act and that would be a
problem solved. What did the Japanese do? Put a sentence
in the conditions of carriage of the carrier. Problem solved
for the people in Japan. They had the same problem we
have. They had no domestic limits of liability for any form
of transportation, and the disparity between the interna-
9 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. App. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Major revisions
were made to the act in 1994, as a result of recodification of the transportation code,
resulting in most of the act being redesignated to 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-41901. See
Pub. L. No. 103-272, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., 108 Stat. 745 (1994); H.R. No. 103-180,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.N. 818.
10 The 1944 Chicago Convention, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944).
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tional and domestic laws just grew, and grew and Japan did
something about it. We are still thrashing around in this
country trying to make modern in 1994 something that
made sense in 1929. We are trying to force the government
to adopt, in 1994, a concept of liability limits that emerged
in the early 1950s, which went from $8,000 to $16,000 and
then to $75,000 in the 60s, and now to 100,000 SDR. To
me, this does not make sense. My friend, Lee Kreindler,
wants to do away with the Warsaw Convention entirely, and
that would be a terrible mistake, because it does bring a
tremendous amount of stability to the international avia-
tion community in all except the limitation of liability.
Professor Bin Cheng has called the Convention limita-
tion of liability the eye of the storm. Limitation could bring
the downfall of the Convention system throughout the
world. The solution is very simple: Do what the Japanese
airlines have done. The storm is then gone. The attacks
will go away. The litigation will end. There is another solu-
tion that is put forward by the advocates of amending the
Convention, adopt Montreal Protocol 3, put in the supple-
mental compensation plan. Listen to the arguments. The
recovery of damages will become certain. How many law-
yers out there who have represented families have failed to
get a recovery? The system will be more just. Why? No-
body comes up with the answer. The people who are advo-
cating these things are not involved in the litigation. I
should say - adopt Montreal Protocol 3, adopt the supple-
mental compensation plan, and I can see another thirty-six
years of litigation at my doorstep trying to unravel those
plans. But, the simple solution for the aviation community,
the insurance community, the passengers, and the courts,
really, is to waive the limit. Then the problem is gone. I am
sure that the insurers who have been in the business of in-
suring airlines for fifty or sixty years will be able to find a
very, very simple solution as to how to fund an unlimited
regime, because they already are doing it anyway.
I have an enormous respect for everyone on this pro-
gram, and I have enormous respect for the views that they
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express. There are honest differences to be dealt with, and
the value of a meeting like this is that it gives an opportu-
nity to quietly, patiently, carefully, and intelligently ex-
amine the merits of the respective positions. Let there be
no misunderstandings about my position, it is, with respect
to the Japanese Initiative, simply this: I think that Japan
Airlines, all Nippon Airlines, the other Japanese airlines,
and the Japanese government are to be congratulated, to
be utterly commended for doing a remarkably sensible
thing. They have come to grips with the simple fact that
there is no defense in this day and age for a limitation of
liability. I am in agreement probably with eighty percent of
what my dear friend, George Tompkins, has said. Why
then, do I oppose the Japanese Initiative?
I would put it this way: Why are we here? What is the
purpose of the exercise? What is the purpose of our legal
system, our tort system in aviation? An accident happens,
terrible disaster occurs, families are ravaged, compensation
has to be paid, and the public must know what happened so
that this terrible thing may never happen again. That's
what we are talking about.
My problem with the position advocated by George is
that it focuses on only one of the two purposes of the sys-
tem. Compensation is extremely important, it is one of the
two purposes of the system, but there is another reason that
the tort system exists, and that is the interest in unraveling
and exposing the fault, exposing lack of care, and finding
out what happened in these awful airplane crashes. There
are, thus, two separate and distinct purposes, and there is
merit and importance to both of them.
The Japanese Initiative solves the purpose of compensa-
tion, and I agree with George, it is the best way to solve the
compensation need; and, if that's all we were talking about,
I would be in favor of the initiative without question at all.
But, the Japanese Initiative, which builds upon the Warsaw
Convention, would also eliminate from our legal system,
from our private investigative system, from our tort system,
any examination whatsoever into fault or accident causa-
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tion. The disaster occurs, the accident occurs, under the
Japanese Initiative, Japan Airlines is liable, Japan Airlines
will pay. Damages will be adequate, which means that the
early offers will be reasonably adequate offers. I can't see
any better means of compensating accident victims. That is
true; but there is another aspect that has been close to me
for over 40 years and is still close to me today. I am pleased
to see in this room an interest represented, though they are
on different sides of this issue, at least two Lockerbie11 fami-
lies. Vickie Cummock has taken a position in favor of the
Montreal Protocol. Kathleen Flynn appeared with me
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify
against the Montreal Protocol.
Why? Why did Kathleen Flynn and other Lockerbie vic-
tims take this position against the Montreal Protocol? Let's
use Lockerbie as an example. While only one example, it is
the most recent. The main reason that the world knows
what happened in Lockerbie is the Lockerbie litigation.
We had an opportunity to probe into the disaster. We had
a chance to peel off the outer wrapper. We had to keep
clear of the criminal investigation; but, we had the right to
examine witnesses. We had the right to go into the Frank-
furt base of Pan Am and take the testimony of the people
who used the x-ray machine, people who did the security,
the screeners who were supposed to be screening passen-
gers. Our case was the basis for the world knowing about
the filth of Lockerbie. We uncovered an awful mess and
also, with respect to Lockerbie, we had an opportunity to go
into the question of what caused Lockerbie in terms of how
the bomb got on the airplane. We, in a sense, were the
public's representatives, in taking the testimony of people
in Frankfurt who ran off the computer printout that
demonstrated that there was an unaccompanied bag from
Air Malta KM 180, destined for Pan Am 103. We were do-
ing the public's work of explaining how 270 of our citizens
and the citizens of other countries were killed.
11 See In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, 709 F. Supp. 231
(J.P.M.L. 1989), aff'd, 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
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The problem with the Japanese Initiative is that public
investigation would not happen under it. This exposure
wouldn't have happened in any one of the myriad cases
that I have participated in myself, and I'm just one lawyer.
We had a chance to examine what went wrong, we had a
chance to focus on fault, and we had a chance to focus on
causation in a way that has made, and will continue to
make, aviation safer. That will continue to protect all of us.
There is a real difference of opinion as to how valuable
the tort system is in uncovering what has happened. I won't
go into the details of a lot of cases, but I'll tell you one
personal story. Tom McLaughlin might get a kick out of
this, his partner Keith Gerrard might not get so much of a
kick out of it, but I remember a case back in 1961 when the
American Ice Skating Team was flying over to Europe to
participate in the World Skating Championships. I have
thought of this many times in the last few weeks in light of
the Tonya Harding problem. As the Sabena Airlines Boe-
ing 707 approached the Brussels airport, it suddenly was ob-
served to begin to porpoise, and it porpoised and
porpoised, and circled the airport many times and then
crashed. For the next three years of my life I was involved
in litigation against Boeing, a tort case, a Warsaw Conven-
tion tort case. 12 We found no way to break the liability limit
with respect to the airline, but we did have a chance to pur-
sue the manufacturer. In those days, the head of the Boe-
ing investigative team and the interface between us, Boeing,
and its engineers was a wonderful man by the name of
Prater Hogue. I'm sure Tom remembers him well, and
Prater was the sweetest, softest, most wonderful guy I re-
member. I remember, after all my cases and all the
problems I was causing Boeing, he personally escorted me
through the Boeing plant in Renton, Washington. Of
course, he tried to explain what those white tickets were -
this aircraft is for Pan Am, this is for American. That engi-
neer, you see, works for Pan Am. That guy is the represen-
12 See Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne,
242 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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tative of American, and that fellow Lufthansa. So, Boeing
really wasn't making the airplanes; the airlines themselves
were, and why should I have to sue Boeing?
But, that aside, Prater gave me my tour of the Boeing
plant and Prater would sit in the room when I took deposi-
tions of Boeing's engineers. I remember taking the deposi-
tion of Roger Chandler in that case. Chandler was the chief
control systems designer for Boeing. At this time they were
beginning to work on the 747, and Roger Chandler, who
had been in charge of the control system of the 707, was in
charge of the control system design of the 747. Patiently,
across the deposition table, with no shouting or screaming,
but with a lot of documents and quiet questions, we got into
the areas that caused that horrible accident. We were able
to pinpoint the design errors that caused the crash. The
cases were ultimately settled.
A long time later, about ten years ago, Prater retired
from Boeing, and, mind you, in virtually all the depositions
we had taken in cases against Boeing, Prater was in the
room, always puffing away on his pipe, always with a little
wistful smile on his face. And when he retired Boeing gave
him a retirement party, and one of the greatest honors in
my life was that Prater invited me to that party and asked
me to say a few words, and to me that was recognition that
these cases do some good. Prater never said it to me, but
they do some good and they make aviation safer.
That process, in my opinion, we cannot give up. The Jap-
anese Initiative is a great step forward but we have to find
some better way. The better way is to denounce the Warsaw
Convention. We don't need the Warsaw Convention. We
don't need it for choice of law; we never did need the treaty
for choice of law in the United States. We get along with-
out it in handling domestic cases. It serves no purpose
whatsoever. We don't need the Warsaw Convention. We
should denounce it. That is the best solution. The best so-
lution would provide early settlements in adequate
amounts, because there is plenty of exposure in virtually
831
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every airline crash. There is no limitation under the free
tort system based on negligence.
The solution that Warren Dean will offer, and I'll have
something to say after Warren speaks, has the same basic
defect in it that the Japanese Initiative has-under the
Montreal Protocols, there would be no examination whatso-
ever into fault or into accident causation. Under the Mon-
treal Protocols, the airlines would be liable up to 100,000
SDR, roughly $130,000 today. That's the limitation, and
limitations are inexcusable. I'll rely on everything George
said on that subject.
Recovering more than the $130,000 or 100,000 SDR
would require a supplemental compensation plan, which is
the other main reason I oppose the Montreal Protocols.
Adoption of the Protocols is the worst possible way to solve
the problem. The Protocol would be an amendment to the
Warsaw Convention. That's what the word "protocol"
means in international law. Under Article 35-A of the Pro-
tocol, a country, such as the United States can have a sup-
plemental compensation plan, provided it doesn't increase
the airline's liability and provided it doesn't increase ad-
ministrative burden. What that means is, for the passenger
to get anything above $130,000, there has to be, and there
can only be a system of first party insurance. The passen-
gers will have to buy insurance to protect themselves against
the airline's negligence. That's what Montreal Protocol
number 3 means: mandatory insurance imposed on the pas-
sengers. It would be just as though you went to see your
medical doctor, and you had to buy an insurance policy
when you walked in the door in case the doctor committed
malpractice.
To sum up, the Montreal Protocols are no good because
they perpetuate the limit of liability. We lose the benefit of
the fault system. We would lose the benefit of digging into
fault and causation. We would have to set up another new
bureaucracy. And we would impose the cost on the
passenger.
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The best way to protect the public, recognizing the need
for adequate compensation on the one hand, but also rec-
ognizing the need to keep society protected, to protect it-
self from malfeasance and to protect future accidents, is to
denounce Warsaw.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: George, you will get another chance and so
will Lee and Warren. Let's have your view.
Mr. Dean: Thank you, Joe, and thank you for the intro-
duction. I have been at this a little less time than some of
my distinguished colleagues here, but already I'm getting to
feel quite old. You see, I can remember standing up in fo-
rums like this and debating with Lee Kreindler when he
took the position that what we ought to do is exactly what
the Japanese did. Today, however, Lee takes the position
that we should denounce the Warsaw Convention. 13 Some
time ago Lee participated in a symposium where he said
that if the carriers would agree to absolute liability without
limitation, he would have to support them in spite of his
selfish interest as a lawyer. I commended him for his posi-
tion then, but given his new position I'm beginning to
think things are starting to pass me by. I also have to point
out that arguments change with time and they change with
time for reasons that are hard to foresee. George properly
points out that $100,000 is not a lot of money. You see the
$100,000 was agreed to in 1971. In today's dollars,
$100,000 in 1971 currency would be somewhere around
$400,000. The treaty itself provided for an adjustment
mechanism, part automatic and part discretionary, to in-
crease the limit of liability. The United States has nobody
but itself to blame for the fact that the Protocol was not
ratified. I have no doubt, however, that the government of
the United States will fulfill its commitment to ratify the
Protocol. The United States took the lead role in the nego-
tiations and would have updated the limit. So, I think it is a
13 In fact, Mr. Kreindler has strongly opposed the Warsaw Convention consistently
for a long time. See, Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31
J. AIR L. & Com. 291 (1965).
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false premise to argue about whether the $100,000 makes
sense simply because the United States failed to ratify,
within the time frame, the Protocol they took the lead in
negotiating. I'm not here to argue, however, for or against
what we now refer to as the Japanese Initiative. George is
absolutely right-the Japanese Initiative is fault-based. Spe-
cifically, it establishes a fault-based system for claims for
compensatory damages over 100,000 SDR, and, to that ex-
tent, it preserves, as Mr. Kreindler would like to, some sys-
tem of accountability. The question is, however, does such
a system of accountability function, is it necessary, is it ap-
propriate in international air transportation, and is it some-
thing that's worth paying for? And the answer to all those
questions is, obviously, "no."
The reason the answer to these questions is obviously no
is because, first, the Japanese Initiative doesn't work. A
couple of years ago I brought a claim as a plaintiff's lawyer.
It was a very interesting case up here in New York involving
a product liability claim in the medical area. The product,
which was used widely, was very important to medical safety.
In fact, there may come a time when more than one of you
have to rely on a product like this. I'd love to tell you about
it and give you my conclusion about why I thought it was
unsafe. I think you all would find it so, but "unfortunately"
I signed a protective order, and I can't tell you a thing
about that case, because if I did, I'd violate the protective
order and impair my client's recovery, impair my obliga-
tions to the court, and impair my obligations to the tort
system. So, the idea that tort law serves as a vehicle for ex-
posing defects in products that circulate in society is a false
premise. Quite simply, the tort system never has, and never
will effectively do so. Furthermore, the tort law's function is
not to find out exactly what happened; its function is to
provide for recovery. We have seen that, as long as we are
going to mention cases, in the KAL 007 litigation,' 4 where
we found out what happened after Boris Yeltsin revealed
14 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
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the tapes- but that was after the trial. We don't actually
know what happened and we may never know, even though
that case has gone through the court system. The point is
that the tort system does not function as a safety watchdog.
If we were to try and sell it as a safety watchdog I assume the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) would come after us for
false and misleading advertising, and rightly so.
The interesting thing about that aspect of the tort system,
though, is its cost. Even if it did provide some kind of pub-
lic venting of the causes of accidents that brought the litiga-
tion, consider the cost, both human and financial, of
maintaining such a system. People go without compensa-
tion for five or ten years, and many people go without any
compensation, all for the privilege of having some satisfac-
tion about knowing that they may or may not find out what
caused the accident. For example, when you have a child
that is heading off to college and you can't get compensa-
tion for your economic losses in sufficient time to pay for
that one period, that one fleeting and very valuable mo-
ment in a child's life when that child gets ready to go to
college, what cost have you extracted, against the will of
most of the people who go through this experience, for the
privilege of trying to discover what you may or may not find
out was the cause of the accident?
This cost is a huge tax; it is an unconscionable tax, and it
is a very, very unfair tax to the people who go through it.
And, it is not just the standard of liability that imposes the
tax. If you have to prove fault, you have to obtain some
discovery. We are talking international commerce here. I
know of one case that took five years, and, whether the stan-
dard is willful misconduct, gross negligence, the Warsaw-
Hague standard, which is too lengthy to repeat here, simple
negligence, or even, but hopefully not, rebuttable
negligence.
You still have to take the deposition. The deponent may
be in a foreign country, or may not be an employee of one
of the parties to the litigation. If the deponent is not a
party to the litigation, then you have to pursue interna-
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tional discovery procedures that are represented in treaties
too arcane to even discuss today, and that, in and of itself, is
a real problem. So the question that we have here is
whether, as in the case of almost all other international
treaties that establish liability regimes, we should recognize
the difficulties, recognize the fact that we are dealing with
international commerce, and devise a treaty that provides a
responsible system that allows people to bridge those
difficulties.
Our courts were not meant to be the tort forum for the
world and they don't function well in that capacity. George
mentioned that he thought that most plaintiffs recovered.
Well, I have a list; and some of them are published names.
Some of them are called bar canon, and other cases that
are familiar to you here, and they didn't get recovery; at
least not by their expectations. When I was in government,
people used to come in and see us on a regular basis about
how the system was working for them, and it was not a par-
ticularly pretty picture. So, I guess I have to say I'm not
necessarily here to suggest that we ought to have one partic-
ular approach or another. We must have an international
system. We must have an international treaty. We must
have rules that people can understand and rely upon, and
we must have a system that works to bridge the awkwardness
and difficulty of the international air transportation system
that people encounter in attempting to get compensation
for their losses.
That is our obligation. That's an obligation of the gov-
ernment, and the government has met that obligation.
They signed a treaty. The treaty is not perfect, but I can
assure you that we can make it work and we can make it
work for the benefit of the passengers that use the service. I
also want to mention one thing in passing, however. The
treaty covers a lot more than passenger compensation.
The treaty provides rules for cargo and baggage as well,
and those are important components of the treaty system.
And, not only are those important components of the treaty
system, but George is absolutely right when he says it is a
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private international law treaty, but, the treaty does estab-
lish obligations for governments, and those obligations are
that governments cannot pass laws that prohibit compensa-
tion to victims of air crashes. Those obligations are that
governments cannot unilaterally change the terms of liabil-
ity that are available to passengers in international air trans-
portation, as they could without a treaty.
Absent a treaty, there is absolutely no assurance that gov-
ernments will not unilaterally change such terms. As a mat-
ter of fact, I can think of 500 ways right now that a foreign
government could frustrate the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
with the kind of reach that foreign governments have over
foreign air transportation. Thus, the question is whether
the government should agree to make sure that people are
compensated for their losses and whether the United States
Government should agree to carry forward its commitment
along those lines to make sure that the Americans get the
recoveries to which they are accustomed. I think the an-
swer to that is yes, but if we cannot obtain approval of the
Montreal Protocols, then I think the inevitable question is
raised about what we do next, and I think something along
the lines of the Japanese Initiative is going to be something
that we will take a hard look at.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) says
it filed a petition before the Department of Transportation
seeking discussion authority and antitrust immunity to con-
sider the wide range of issues posed by special contracts like
the Japanese Initiative. Absent such authority and immu-
nity, the carriers may notjointly discuss those issues in light
of the operation of U.S. antitrust laws. That petition re-
mains pending. Some way or another we are going to find
a way to solve this problem, but we will solve it with an inter-
national treaty system, and the reason we will solve it that
way is because we must. Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: Now the time for rebuttal. Now we have had
the advocates give their position, and the question is
whether any of the commentators or people that we have
invited will agree with anyone.
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First, we have a perspective from an airframe manufac-
turer, by way of a represenative from the law firm of Perkins
Coie. He is Tom McLaughlin. His firm, of which he is a
partner, has been general counsel to the Boeing company
for many years. Tom comes to New York from Seattle for
his partner, Keith Gerrard. Tom is a Harvard man and has
been in aviation products defense for 18 years. He has rep-
resented Boeing in several major air crashes such as Lauda
Air in Thailand,15 United Airlines' Colorado Springs acci-
dent, 16 Japan Airlines, and the Air Florida accident.'7 Be-
sides the "big boy" defenses we referred to, the heavy iron
people, Tom has defended some general aviation cases. He
has also been active in the legislative area for product liabil-
ity and tort reform. In this regard, Tom has represented
Boeing and the Aerospace Industries Association and other
AIA members such as McDonnell Douglas, General Electric
and Pratt & Whitney in connection with the airlines' efforts
to obtain ratification of the Montreal Protocol.
Tom also gave me a hand by participating in an amicus
brief on behalf of the AIA in my position for Piper Aircraft,
when we tried to go to the United States Supreme Court for
federal preemption of the FAR's for manufacturers.
Again, I thank you.
The second observation will come from Gary Allen, who
is the director of aviation and admiralty litigation for the
torts branch, civil division of the Department of Justice. In
this position, Gary is responsible for approximately 1500
claims, for or against the United States, with alleged values
exceeding $16 billion. He has a staff of 60 attorneys in of-
fices in Washington, D.C., New York, and San Francisco.
Among the claims handled by Gary and his staff were the
space shuttle Challenger explosion and Exxon Valdez spill
in Alaska, as well as many, many that you all have been in-
,, See Charles P. Wallace, Austrian Jet Explodes in Thailand, WAsH. POST, May 27,
1991, at Al (reporting the crash of a Lauda Air Boeing 767 Near Bangkok, Thailand,
on May 26, 1991).
16 See In re Colorado Springs Air Crash, 867 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
17 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Wash., D.C., on Jan. 13, 1983, 559 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1983).
838
1995] INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL LIABILITY
volved in. He was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate from Ohio
State, and served as editor of the Georgetown Law Journal
on his way to his juris doctor degree. Gary started at the
Department of Transportation in its legal honors program,
then the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) litigation
division. He has tried many aviation cases and now is only
two circuits short of having argued in every United States
Court of Appeals.
Mr. Allen is an active pilot and recreational boater. He is
a contributing editor to the Lawyer Pilot Bar Association
Journal, and his regular column, The View From Justice, is a
must on my reading list.
I thank you for coming from Washington, D.C.
Our third commentator, an old friend of mine, Peter
Magee, will be presenting the views of the insurers. Pete is
now executive vice president and general counsel and di-
rector of claims for Associated Aviation Underwriters
(AAU), one of the world's largest leading aviation
underwriters.
I first met Pete when he was a plaintiff's attorney with a
forerunner firm of Speiser Krause and Madole. Pete, you
really had a checkered career, didn't you?
After having begun as a defense lawyer at Bigham, En-
gler, he has been with the AAU for the past 20 years.
Before AAU moved to New Jersey, we used to enjoy Pete's
war stories from his Marine Corps days in Korea, where he
flew the Corsair and later the Grumman F-9F Panther jet,
and again, I thank you for being here. Tom, you may start
it off.
Mr. McLaughlin: Thank you very much, Joe.
I don't have terribly extensive comments to make, and
I'm certainly not speaking on behalf of any particular man-
ufacturer. As Joe mentioned, I have worked with a number
of the major airframe and engine manufacturers on issues
related to the Montreal Protocol and have had an opportu-
nity to pick up on some of their views. So, I think I can
speak reasonably accurately.
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I think manufacturers certainly are in agreement that the
existing system is a bad one and is in desperate need of
replacement. The existing system is one that creates an un-
level playing field, frequently causes claimants large delays,
as has been mentioned, and frequently presents claimants
with a choice of trying to jump over the willful misconduct
hurdle that's been placed before them - which increas-
ingly seems to be not that high a hurdle - or, alternatively,
trying to find some other deep pocket, such as Lee alluded
to in the case of the Sabena accident many years ago, well
before my time. The existing system is grossly unfair and
outdated, and needs to be changed.
Now, if we were to renounce the Warsaw Convention, en-
tirely, or if we were to go to a fault system along the model
that the Japanese have proposed, the manufacturers believe
that you would be returning the system pretty close to what
we have in the domestic arena today. In the domestic area,
the manufacturers find the system to be reasonably tolera-
ble, given some of the basic faults of the tort system. Do-
mestic accident litigation tends to result in agreements
among the defendants or between plaintiffs and defendants
so that the cases don't end up going to trial. There are no-
contest stipulations in the exchange for waivers of punitive
damages, and compensation is available in reasonable
amounts fairly early in the game.
There may also be funding agreements where the manu-
facturers, the airlines and other parties, such as the FAA,
agree at some early stage on how they are going to divide
things up, or at least fund matters, and agree later how to
divide up the payments. So the system seems to function
reasonably well in the domestic arena.
A number of years ago the manufacturers tried to get
Congress interested in what was called an Air Travel Com-
pensation Act, which basically went to a no fault system in
the domestic area. Under this Act, if you were killed or in-
jured on a domestic flight, which obviously wasn't your
fault, you would get quick compensation and the involved
parties would sort out their shares later. I think many of
840
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the manufacturers still think that this Act would be a good
idea.
Lee mentioned the deterrence function of tort law and
the need to publicly expose wrongdoing. There are plenty
of other ways that the deterrence function of the tort system
is satisfied after aviation accidents. We have the official in-
vestigation, of course. Huge resources go into the National
Transportation Safety Board's efforts to find out what
caused the crash, and all of their findings are public knowl-
edge. I recognize that circumstances may be different
sometimes in foreign investigated accidents. You also, of
course, have the deterrence effect of the amounts of money
that are paid and the adverse public relations and sales im-
age for the companies involved. Manufacturers don't want
to see accidents involving their products. They don't want
to have the associated costs affect their future premiums.
So, there are plenty of reasons for deterrence short of plain-
tiffs' lawyers acting as private attorneys general.
The manufacturers have been taking a close look, over
the last few years, at the package that the airlines have pro-
posed in the way of a supplemental compensation plan that
would go on top of the Montreal Protocol if it were ratified
in the United States, and, frankly, the manufacturers have
serious problems with what has been proposed.
The Montreal Protocol, of course, throws up not just a
hurdle like willful misconduct, but an absolute wall against
any further liability of the airline. The Protocol provides
nothing in the way of protection for the manufacturer. So,
there are serious concerns about what the impact of that
would be on manufacturers. They also have a lot of ques-
tions about the details of how it would work.
For example, the plan administrator, who would be in
charge of making the supplemental compensation plan
payments, is charged under the proposed bill with using all
reasonable efforts to try to collect the amounts that have
been paid to the plaintiffs from at-fault entities other than
the involved airline. He does that by taking an assignment
from everyone he settles with, standing in their shoes, and,
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presumably, going after anyone and everyone in order to
satisfy this all reasonable efforts test. The manufacturers
are concerned that the plan administrator will be likely to
make some bad choices in that regard because he is going
to be questioned by Congress and by the administration
about why he is charging $5 a ticket instead of $4 a ticket
when he didn't go over XYZ in a particular case trying to
get some money back. So, there are likely to be claims by
the plan administrator that would not be brought if we were
in the area of a fault system where cooperative agreements
are reached.
And, the fact that, when those reimbursement claims are
brought by the plan administrator, the manufacturer might
be responsible for paying more than its fair share, under
joint and several liability concepts, with absent parties' fault
not being taken into consideration is more troubling. Man-
ufacturers, I believe, are willing to pay their fair share when
they are responsible for a portion of an accident, but they
are naturally quite resistant to having to pay more than
that.
Mention was made of the cargo aspects of the treaty.
Manufacturers have been supportive of the cargo airlines in
their attempts to get modernization of the various
paperwork that goes along with that type of activity. At least
to date, Montreal Protocol 4 has been lumped together
with Montreal Protocol 3 and hasn't gone anywhere. I
think I will leave it at that, and may have additional com-
ments later.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: Thank you, Tom.
Now, for the government's point of view, Gary Allen.
Mr. Allen: Thank you.
I'm one of those guys George was referring to who is
down in Washington trying to do this and that with the
Montreal Protocol system. Actually, I'm not, and I should
make that clear from the outset. In my job, which is not a
policy job, we have the opportunity to provide support to
an administration as it works through and develops posi-
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tions on matters like the Montreal Protocols. In that role,
we had the privilege of working with, in my case, three ad-
ministrations on this issue. So, first of all, let me say that
the Clinton administration has, like every administration
since 1976, endorsed,just recently through its Civil Aviation
Initiative,18 an adoption of Montreal Protocol 3 and 4, basi-
cally for the same reasons that other administrations have
endorsed it. They recognized, as virtually all of us do here,
the difficulties that other speakers have alluded to, and with
which most of us have personal familiarity, that the present
circumstances force on us, whether we are plaintiffs or de-
fendants in litigation. But, I also think - and from here
on I launch into my personal observations and not those of
the Administration - that one can safely say there is a rec-
ognition in this Administration, as in those before, of the
historic value of the Warsaw Convention. One way, I sup-
pose, is to see the Warsaw Convention as a 1929 car with a
1994 engine stuffed into it, but I think that does a little bit
of a disservice to this vehicle, which has served, in many
ways, very well over the years as the industry has evolved
from its fledgling beginnings to what we have today. Listen-
ing to the stories of Lee Kreindler and others that have
been at this a long time reminds me of the story back in the
mid 1960s of a traveler regarding, with some trepidation,
the DC-6 leaking oil on the ramp as he was about to board
to cross the Atlantic. He said to the gate agent, "How long
has it been since one of those things of yours went in the
drink?" The guy thought for a minute and said, "1957."
The traveler said, "Well that's not so bad." The gate agent
said, "Well, I guess you don't think so, it's 21:30 now."
I would echo some of the comments here that when we
turn to the tort system to be the superior vehicle of choice
in accident investigation, I think that's a troublesome con-
cept. I would certainly agree that on occasion the tort sys-
tem has been invaluable in getting to some of the root
18 See generally, Administration Unveils Sweeping Aviation Initiative, INSIDE DOT &
TRANsp. WL,Jan. 7, 1994, at 1 (commenting on the Clinton Administration's Initia-
tive to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry, released in January 1994).
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causes of aviation accidents, but I would say that normally
the accident investigators of the United States and certainly
of most of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) countries, have proven themselves most capable
over the years of performing that function and performing
it well. I think it also important to remember that on the
odd occasion out, and fortunately they are rare so far,
where you have sabotage or terrorism, as we had in Pan Am
103, the very workings of our tort litigation system can be
most difficult for those charged with the vital task of bring-
ing to the bar of criminal justice those responsible for such
reprehensible acts. My office did play a role in the Pan Am
103 litigation in defending the government against at-
tempted encroachments by both sides, both the defendant
Pan Am and the plaintiffs, each of whom sought, for their
own valid litigative reasons, to reach into the government's
ongoing criminal investigation to get information helpful
to their cause. The distress and resource displacement that
caused within the law enforcement community was very
real, and very difficult, and, unfortunately, distracting in a
time such as ours where government resources of all sorts
are severely strained. So, I think remembering that the fact-
finding, or alleged fact-finding, of a piece of civil litigation
can, in fact, be very difficult when there are criminal mat-
ters involved is important.
I think, to be brief, the Japanese Initiative certainly is an
alternative to the present situation. Is it superior to the op-
portunity posed by Montreal Protocols 3 and 4, and the
supplemental compensation plans presently proposed? I
suspect not. Under the supplemental compensation plan,
the very worst that one would have, first of all, is a circum-
stance in which U.S. passengers would be assured of full,
and hopefully speedy, compensation under a system whose
values would be based in U.S. tort law, the most generous in
the world. Secondly, as to the ultimate allocation of those
burdens among potential tortfeasors, I think the present
tort system on the defense side works reasonably well.
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I I have had the privilege of sitting down at tables with
John Brennan, Russ Mirabile, Pete Magee, and others in
this audience, on the plaintiff and defense side. Speaking
as a defendant, we have had the opportunity to sit down in
many cases, certainly not all, to see whether a reasonable
accommodation can be reached that would, at the end of
the day, provide a relatively meaningful allocation without
the need of expensive litigation. I don't see operation
under the supplemental compensation plan as being appre-
ciably different from that. I don't frankly see potential con-
gressional oversight, or anything of that sort, as a significant
factor. I think the plan would be a simple extension and
relatively seamless transition from the system that we pres-
ently have.
One thing is clear. The present situation, though worka-
ble, is extremely difficult, is inefficient, distorts litigative re-
lationships, and brings parties into litigation that don't
belong there. The existing regime is fractious and
inefficient.
And, so, the Japanese Initiative, though a step in the right
direction, is not as attractive a step as would be the proper
ratification of Protocols 3 and 4 with a supplemental plan.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: Now for the insurance view, Pete Magee.
Mr. Magee: Thank you, Joe.
After listening to everyone, I feel very much like Admiral
Stockdale at the vice presidential debate. Why am I here?
I have had a second career. I have been on all sides. I
started out as a defense attorney for about seven years, and
then, for about eight years, was a plaintiffs' attorney for a
firm in competition with Lee. The last 21 years or so of my
career has been with the underwriters. On any of the sides
I was on, I never felt that I was there promoting safety. I
had a client and I represented the client. And on the de-
fense side, I was protecting the client and minimizing dam-
ages. As a plaintiff, I was there to get money for them. The
one thing I've learned over all these years is that the system
works because we've got the money, and they come to us
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and they want to get it. Safety has never been an issue. I
don't doubt that Lee believes safety is an issue. We have
argued this over the years, but I think the system itself has
that built into it, and I don't think that other nations may
not be as sophisticated as us-they have an interest in it
too, the manufacturer wants to know his product doesn't
cause another accident. The government is interested in
air traffic control, and so on, so I never felt that safety was
an issue in which I was involved.
As for the insurance industry, from the comments you
can understand that any decision, whether as to Montreal
Protocol 3 and its supplemental plan or the Japanese Initia-
tive, affects a lot of the segments of the industry. I think
that the position of the insurers is misunderstood, and I
think this is because we don't have a position. I represent
the Associated Aviation Underwriters (AAU), and we are in
the same position as the other aviation insurers. We are a
supplier to the aviation industry-we supply a product that
is capacity and service, and we supply it to all segments of
the aviation industry, whether airlines, manufacturers, air-
ports, or whatever.
So, taking a position would be inappropriate, and, in fact,
there isn't any official position. To put it another way, as a
supplier we adapt to the rules; we don't make them. But,
we do have thoughts on the things that have been
proposed.
As to the Japanese Initiative, the beauty of it, and I have
said this in other places, is its simplicity. Use Article 22 and
just say "no limit." In all the years in which I was dealing
with the Warsaw Convention, that was the point I would
raise-why can't we just do away with the limit, because it
causes more problems and we spend more time and money
on litigation on a very small segment of cases that are dis-
proportionate to major accidents. In the the Arrow litiga-
tion,19 remember the military airlift coming back some
years ago, I think 1989, involving an accident up in Canada,
19 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D.
Ky. 1987).
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we had 250 soldiers on board. We had all that litigation
wrapped up within two years and everyone recovered. We
spend more time and effort on a single Warsaw Convention
case than we spend on all others. We have litigation, like
the United Airlines accident at Colorado Springs. There is
a domestic accident, I think the flight was from Peoria to
Chicago to Denver to Colorado Springs. We had three tick-
ets covered by the Warsaw Convention on the airplane. We
will get rid of that case even though it is a very interesting
one. No one to this day knows what happened, and I don't
see any plaintiffs' attorneys running out wanting to get on
the committee to get there and take the lead on that one,
but, we will have more trouble with those three Warsaw
Convention cases than anything else involved with that
accident.
But, I was always told we had to keep the Warsaw Conven-
tion because it was the only way the other nations could
abide by it and we wanted uniformity, those things you have
heard, ticketing, waybills and the like. My thought always
was, all right, keep all those things, like the ocean marine
people do,20 and just remove the limit. TheJapanese did it,
the world has not come to an end, and their system seems
to be functioning. But, the Japanese Initiative has some
problems and I will comment on them.
The Japanese Initiative is simplicity and all that goes with
it. If everyone were to adopt it, then the problem is solved,
everything meshes together, and you have the Warsaw Con-
vention as it is now, without the limitation; but, part of the
problem is that not all the airlines are going to go along
with it. If they don't, then you have problems. Take a flight
from Tokyo to Los Angeles to Chicago on United with the
Tokyo to Los Angeles portion on Japan Airlines and the Los
Angeles to Chicago portion on United. Japan Airlines takes
the position in the Initiative and the paper they put out,
they say very clearly that the Japanese Initiative only applies
to the segment that Japan Airlines flies. That is well of
-o See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-767 (1988).
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them to say and it may be true, but, I can't for one minute
believe that a plaintiffs' attorney is going to accept that.
And, so, if the injury is on the United segment, and involves
an international ticket faced with a Warsaw Convention lim-
itation, they are going to argue there is only one contract of
carriage, that it is a seamless garment, and while you can
only sue for the injury suffered on United, the entire con-
tract applies and the limitation was removed by Japan Air-
lines; so, therefore, I have unlimited damages. Litigation is
the only way we would find out how that would sort itself
out. If all the airlines were to go along with it, then the
problem isn't there.
As far as the Montreal Protocols, I think the Japanese said
it best. They were waiting and it never got done, so they
went and did what they did. The Protocols and the supple-
mental plan have some problems. On their face, they seem
to have solved the problem, that is the recovery for injured
people of unlimited damages. The Montreal Protocols
have gone through various propositions to where they are
today, simply unlimited damages, but they have problems
from the underwriting side, and I don't profess to speak as
an underwriter. I have enough problems with the claims
end, but, from the underwriting side, the way the plan is set
up you have to accept unlimited liability. But, you have to
put a limit on the amount of the ticket or surcharge you
can make. Is that surcharge going to be enough to cover
the exposure that you have?
On the claims side, you have shifting responsibilities for
adjusting the claim, and the problems that come out of
that. Right now, an air carrier will select its lead insurer.
Well, I should stop a moment. I'm not sure everyone here
would understand. For example, you don't have a single
insurer that insures United. The market is vertical. You
have all the various markets, the American market, Lloyd's,
the French, and so on, all of whom have a portion of the
market or a percentage of it. There is one insurer who is
designated the lead to handle the underwriting function
and, from my point of view, the claim function; and that's
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part of the service that we offer. An airline may hire or seek
out an insurer for the claims service. Under the plan, the
supplemental plan under the Montreal Protocol, the first
100,000 SDR would be adjusted by the claim service that the
carrier selected. Above the 100,000 SDR, the plan adminis-
trator is involved and he may have a different claims service,
and that claims service will adjust the claim for the carrier,
and it may be a claims service that the carrier did not want
to have representing them in the first instance. But, these
are practical problems that probably could be solved along
the way. You have other problems where the claim is in the
gray area. Maybe we believe, or the plan administrator be-
lieves the claim is less than 100,000 SDR in value, and the
plaintiffs believe it is more, and then the question that
comes up is, whether the plan administrator is going to tell
the insurer of the carrier we want you to settle this claim
within the 100,000 SDR. If this can be done, am I going to
be accused of bad faith if it doesn't happen, and who is
going to be suing who? But, again, they may be practical
problems that can be solved.
From the insurer's standpoint, I speak with limited
knowledge. I'm a claims person, not an underwriter, and
there are underwriting problems that perhaps I don't know
about. But, even when I look at it from the claims stand-
point, I would like to get rid of the Warsaw Convention. It
causes more grief, more headaches, and more litigation.
Whatever plan they would decide upon, whoever it is that's
going to decide, from the insurer's standpoint, just tell us
what the rules are and we can price our product to the
rules. So, from an insurance standpoint, we have no posi-
tion other than to ask what the position is.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: I guess you can see there are some differing
opinions. What we will do now is let the advocates rebut
and then anyone who has questions can ask them of any
person. Starting with George, do you have any rebuttal?
Mr. Tompkins: I just want to make a few comments.
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I forgot to mention that I brought with me several copies
of six articles on the Japanese Initiative, which you may find
interesting, from a variety of people. The lead article is by
Koichi Abe of Japan Airlines, who describes what they did
and why. There also is one by Tony Mercer of Air New Zea-
land, who has been a very staunch advocate of Montreal
Protocol 3, but he looked at the Japanese Initiative in a dif-
ferent light and said maybe that it is not a bad idea for
those that have the problem they have in Japan - the dis-
parity between international and domestic limits.
Let me make a couple of observations. One thing we
tend to overlook in these discussions is the interest of the
airlines. If the airline is unfortunate enough to have an ac-
cident, all the airline really wants to do is to see that the
families of their passengers are compensated fairly, fully,
and quickly. They do not want to get embroiled in pro-
tracted litigation with the families, or protracted litigation
with the FTC or manufacturers, and, thereby, have the pas-
sengers' families wait to be compensated. The airlines want
to get the matter out of the way and get back to the business
of running an airline. That is something we have to keep in
mind.
The Japanese Initiative accomplishes the goal of timely
compensation because, with the approval of their insurers,
the airlines ofJapan can go out in any case and compensate
all of the families of their passengers. At the same time, if
the insurers of the airline want to fight it out with the man-
ufacturer or FTC later on, or during the time the families
are being compensated, the prime objective of the airline
will not be delayed. That is something we have to keep in
mind. Where the limit is not applicable, cases are disposed
of fairly quickly, and in big cases, for example, in the Tener-
ife disaster litigation,2 ' the limitation did not apply because
there was a collision of the aircraft of two airlines. The
passengers in one aircraft sued the operator of the other,
and vice versa, and every case dealt with damages only. I
21 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977, 435
F. Supp. 927 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
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think only six cases were tried on quantum and they were
done as quickly as possible. There were six or seven other
cases, if I remember correctly, and one was the Japan air-
lines crash in 1985 - a domestic flight with 505 passengers
killed, no limit of liability, and those cases were all settled
by Japan Airlines on behalf of Boeing and Japan Airlines in
accordance with Japanese customs, while Tom's partner
and I were working behind the curtain as to who was going
to pay what, but there was no liability litigation out of that
disaster.22
Litigation is absolutely essential when there is a limita-
tion. The insurers have to defend the limitation. We have
to defend the limitation because that is the law, and people
that Lee represents have to fight to break the limit because
$75,000 just is not enough to compensate people today.
The guys in Washington do not agree. I had a frighten-
ing experience in the Senate when we were there in 1983.
The Senators are those who frighten me, because they do
these things without knowing why they are doing them, or
anything about them. I had that experience in 1983 with
the Senate minority leader, who was thinking of voting in
favor of the Protocol because the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee said to. And, I think we were meeting Senator Byrd,
as I recall, and we went on for an hour talking to him. I
asked Lee and John if I could speak and they said jump in,
so I did. I said, Senator, let me give you an example. Eight
years ago your state legislature abolished the limit of liabil-
ity, did away with it because it is not in the interest of the
citizens of West Virginia. Let's assume your son is coming
to visit you and Lee's son is coming to visit him from West
Virginia. But, your son is going to go on to play a few
rounds of golf in Bermuda, then go back to West Virginia,
and the plane never gets out of West Virginia. Your son's
widow and children will get $75,000. Lee's son's widow and
children, who are only coming up to Washington, will get
See generally, Douglas V. Nelms, Where the Fault Lies, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Oct.
1994, at 40 (discussing the Aug. 12, 1985 crash in Japan, involving a JAL 747, in
which Boeing managed to resolve all of the domestic claims without litigation).
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whatever the damages are. Senator Byrd said, "you make a
good point," and he voted against the Protocol.
The Senators do not really grasp what the limit of liability
means in real life. I do not understand why the rest of
IATA carriers have not followed what Japan Airlines has
done. Antitrust immunity, with all due respect, is a lot of
gobbledygook. The Department of Transportation has not
acted on the petition before them because they do not
know what to do with it. What is the antitrust issue if air-
lines want to talk about whether they can come to terms
with the Japanese Initiative and waive a limit of liability?
The antitrust issue just is not there, and I think that is part
of the problem. I wear a belt but I don't wear suspenders,
and I am sure a lot of airlines would like to have the protec-
tion of immunity before they talk, but I think you should
forget it and get the carriers to move for the adoption of
the Japanese Initiative.
On the KAL 007 case, you say we now know what hap-
pened. I hardly think so. We asked Judge Robinson to reo-
pen the case based on information the Russians have now
made available, and he is going to hear the motion on April
22. Meanwhile, Judge Robinson has stayed everything in
the case pending the rehearing. If you really want to know
what happened in that case, you should ask your
government.
Thank you.
Mr. Kreindler: I didn't quite know what to expect to-
night, but one thing I didn't expect from George Tompkins
was for him to be speaking with affection of the time when
he, John Brennan and I worked together on a public pro-
ject. So, in that sense alone this was worth the price of
admission.
Another thing I didn't expect, frankly, I spoke to Gary
Allen yesterday, and I haven't seen Gary in a long time. I
was looking for a cleanshaven young man, and not until he
sat up here did I realize that was the real Gary Allen. The
most effective point Gary made with me had to do with his
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beard and mustache, and not with anything he said from
this platform.
With respect to the proposition that the Warsaw Conven-
tion has served us, including the United States government,
well, for lo these many years, I simply put to you the ques-
tion, "how?" The Warsaw Convention hasn't done a
damned thing, except to infringe on the rights of American
citizens in denying them adequate recovery. That's all it
has accomplished. With respect to one other point that
Gary made that there is no need for the tort system, I could
give a lot of examples. One I mentioned earlier, in that
1961 Sabena case involving the Boeing company, there was
a public investigation, but you won't find anything in that
public investigation that probed into the adequacy of the
control system of the airplane; it was not even examined.
We are here tonight talking about international airline
cases, and that means accidents in Thailand and Belgium
and all over the world-countries with less sophistication
than the United Kingdom or United States, and I think the
public needs that kind of protection.
I'll give you another example. Not that I came here to
make speeches enthusiastically complementing John Bren-
nan, but another example is the Turkish Airlines DC-10
thatJohn reminded me of on many occasions. 3 There was
no public investigation. John, you know, produced the fa-
mous Applegate memorandum, which castigated the con-
duct of one, and possibly two, major manufacturers, one of
whom was insured by John's company. 4 This conduct
came to light because within the confines of the tort system
Mr. Brennan thought it should come to light, and it was the
tort system and that case that brought that to public atten-
tion. No public investigation, Gary, so I don't want to stand
on the soap box and give you case after case, but there are a
dozen people in this room who can give you hundreds of
23 See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D.Cal. 1975).
24 See generally MOIRA JOHNSTON, THE LAST NINE MNutr s: THE STORY OF FLIGHT
981 234-37 (discussing the "Applegate Memo").
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examples of important matters of public interest that were
never even scratched by public investigations.
Warren Dean talks in terms of the five or ten years fami-
lies had to wait, and that is terrible, awful, but that's not
because of the tort system, that's because of the limitation
of the Warsaw Convention, the idiotic Warsaw Convention,
an anachronism, an abomination. That's why people have
had to wait for five and ten years. The Warsaw Convention
spawns litigation. It takes a lot of time. We ought to get rid
of it. The only thing that's worse than the Warsaw Conven-
tion is Mr. Dean's Montreal Protocol number 3, which
adds, to all of the problems of Warsaw, the additional prob-
lem of transferring the burden from the defendants, the
tort-feasor, the wrongdoer to the passenger. The burden
passes from the wrongdoer, to the innocent passenger
under the supplemental compensation plan.
As to the question of my consistency over the years, I
probably should plead just a little bit guilty. But, let me
make this clear: I would have embraced the Japanese Initia-
tive today if you wanted to compare it to our present odious
system; it would be far better for the passengers. I ex-
plained that I think we are giving up a lot in giving up the
fault system, but in comparison to what we have now, let's
take it. Along with George, I can't understand why the air-
lines, all of them, haven't adopted it, as distinguished from
the Montreal Protocols. On a comparative basis I will hap-
pily embrace the Japanese Initiative, and there are cases
represented here in the room tonight where immediate ad-
equate compensation would have made all of the differ-
ence. But, my problem is I also know of cases where the
public has benefitted by our tort system.
As far as your protective order point is concerned, War-
ren, I agree with you. I think protective orders are odious.
We fight them all the time. We urge our clients not to
agree or let us agree. Of course, if a client for private inter-
est wants us to go along with the protective order, we do it.
But, we resist protective orders. They do interfere with the
correct operation of the tort system in exposing fault. I
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agree with you about that, but next time I would urge you
not to sign one.
In summary, the Japanese Initiative is a great step for-
ward in the public interest. If we go that route, let us recog-
nize that we are going to give up something terribly
valuable to the public. That concern is what leads me to
oppose it.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: Those who know me probably are aware I'm
rarely without an opinion and I do have one question I will
ask. As I sat here, I'm not supposed to take a side and I
really won't, but I notice that the airlines don't like the
Warsaw Convention limitations. George's position is that
the plaintiffs don't like it, the manufacturers don't like the
Warsaw Convention and the insurers don't like it. Maybe
somebody can explain to me why we have the Warsaw
Convention.
Mr. Dean: I certainly didn't mean to leave the impres-
sion that the airlines don't like the Warsaw system - the
airlines view the Warsaw Convention as being critical. They
want a Warsaw Convention that works. Nonetheless, they
see the treaty system as absolutely essential in international
air transportation. I now, for the first time, am clear on
something tonight. I always learn something, but I now
know why the Montreal Protocols were defeated in 1983.
Senator Byrd wasn't the majority leader, Howard Baker was
and the limitation we were talking about was $300,000, not
$75,000, but nonetheless, it was, in retrospect, a mistake to
have any limitation on the supplemental compensation
plan. We talked about the issue of why the airlines don't, or
should or should not adopt the so-called Japanese Initiative
and how they should get there. And, I mentioned to you
that the IATA had filed an application for approval from
the Department of Transportation and antitrust immunity
to discuss that very subject. George raised the prospect we
didn't need antitrust immunity to discuss that subject and
then he said he wore his belt and doesn't wear suspenders.
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If the belt means tort law and suspenders means antitrust
law, I can understand the conclusion before you.
The fact of the matter is any time competitors get to-
gether to discuss the terms and conditions under which
they will offer their services to the traveling public, includ-
ing the warranties, of those services, that is, per se, conduct
that violates the antitrust laws. There is no public interest
exception written into the antitrust laws of the United
States. As a matter of fact Section 412 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act specifically says that carriers may apply and obtain
antitrust immunity for conduct necessary to secure an im-
portant public benefit. If there were public interest excep-
tions to the antitrust laws of the United States, we wouldn't
need that statute. That statute has worked a number of
times. Maybe Chrysler, Ford and GM ought to be able to sit
down and agree on the terms of their warranty; but, all we
need is one lawsuit saying why did you waive limitation of
the defense of non-negligence under Article 20 paragraph
1 for only $100,000? What about $200,000 or $250, what
about $300,000? And, the plaintiffs in that case would be
entitled to treble damages, what ever that might be, in that
some state attorney general might be able to bring a lawsuit
under his own law or some federal attorney general might
be able to bring a lawsuit under his law. The question
about whether or not approval and immunity under the op-
eration of the antitrust law to work out a system of special
contracts, and to work out some kind of uniformity on spe-
cial contracts, no matter how beneficial to the public, must
obtain prior DOT approval and antitrust immunity. And, as
a person who spent all last year litigating an antitrust case
brought by the Department of Justice, I can assure you
there is no doubt about that.
Mr. Asselta: Thank you.
Mrs. Cummock: Would you entertain comment from a
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I'm Victoria Cummock. I'm a Pan Am 103 widow. For
the past five years I have had the privilege to listen to the
issue of international liabilities, as discussed by various very
eloquent and well educated individuals representing not
only the airline industry, trial attorneys, and many Depart-
ments of Transportation, our own as well as others. I have
watched and listened to the lobbying on all sides of this is-
sue, but, unlike most of you here tonight who choose to
represent one side or the other, I have had to live with this
system, not through choice, but because of tragedy.
My husband John was 38 years old when he boarded Pan
Am 103 on December 21, 1988. I was left widowed with
three small preschool children. This is when my nightmare
began with living through the current Warsaw Convention
system. The reason I'm here today is not for your pity, but
for your consideration, and to remind you that the voice of
the passengers and their families who are left to pick up the
pieces of any individual air disaster must be heard during
discussions like this. Planes will continue to go down for all
types of reasons, and that's a reality that anyone who boards
a plane must live with. I'm not so naive to think that corpo-
rate interests, whether lawyers, airlines or insurance compa-
nies, don't exist, but, more importantly, let us not forget
that we are all airline passengers, and so are our family
members and our friends. Morally, we must work together
to develop a system to care for and protect all future pas-
sengers and disaster victims. I think lawyers decided that
the issue of air disasters is a civil liability issue versus a com-
pensation issue; and, as an average citizen, I resent being
pitted against a major corporation in order to bring sup-
posed justice to a case. Widows, orphans or families should
not have to police an airline industry; our government, the
FAA, the Department of Transportation, and the Depart-
ment of Justice should bear this burden.
The current system is an abomination. It only revic-
timizes the victims' families by dragging them in and out of
court for over a decade at major emotional and financial
cost. On the date the plane went down, I vowed to myself I
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was not going to allow either myself or my three children to
be victims but to be survivors. Little did I know how hard it
was going to be to pick up the pieces when, at any given
time, the nose cone of that plane could be flashed on the
TV as it lay in the fields of Scotland, whether on TV or
newspapers, and most of which is or can be illustrated in
the media either by our own attorney or by the opposing
attorney. All in the name of justice. It is very hard not to
be eventually crippled or revictimized to the point of paral-
ysis, as many families are.
Whether the Montreal Protocol with the compensation
plan is ratified will not make a difference to the Pan Am
103 family members or to the KAL family members, it is not
a retroactive deal. The reason I'm here today is, hopefully,
we can gather all these minds and try to make something
come together to change the system. I have worked in Con-
gress with Senator Mitchell and Senator Dole, in the last
administration as well as the current one, to analyze the
Montreal Protocol system. Man's inhumanity to man is not
limited to evil acts like terrorist bombs; it also deals with
each one of us and morally impacts our lives and not just
our pocketbooks or egos. Everyone talks about how messed
up the system is, and how unjust it is. We are all a part of
that system, everyone here. We must all work together to
make sure that a more humane system exists.
The Scottish law required compensation of the families
in Scotland. They live within a no fault system and have all
been able to get back to the business at hand. Families
there are putting their lives back together. We need a sys-
tem that provides support and stability at the outset for vic-
tims' families.
In my estimation, from what I have seen as the options
right now, the Montreal Protocol system with the compen-
sation plan at least gives the victims' families some money at
the outset. It gives them money to bury their dead, to pro-
bate wills and for trauma support. Supplemental compen-
sation plans allow for incremental damages to be sought
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later without having to prove willful misconduct. This will
probably shorten the process by half the time.
In another ten years, at the end of my trial probably, do I
think that justice is going to be done if we have a positive
outcome on the Pan Am trials? I don't feel that we are go-
ing to be providing any more than impact for policing the
industry.
Pan Am is no longer in existence. Since the executives
guilty of breaking the law have not been brought to justice
by our government, do I feel that the financial penalties
placed against their insurance companies is going to do
anything? No. In ten years, my children will probably be
ready for college. My three-year-old daughter who-well,
she is eight now, but was three at the time of the disaster
couldn't learn how to read because of the trauma that she
had received here. She needed counseling, as did my three
other children.
I have had to spend the majority of my time and money
that has been available to me in order to get our life back
together and get the support that we need. If she was not
able to receive what she needed, and I had to wait for 10 to
15 years, my daughter would probably grow up illiterate, an-
gry, and with very poor self-esteem. All the money in the
world cannot bring back a childhood, and this is the system
that we have all been sentenced to use.
I feel it is important for all of us when you have these
sessions to also look at the passengers and also to look at
each other, because you are all potential passengers. Do
not feel that we are all a bunch of faceless people trying to
look for deep pockets. I feel if there is compensation that
we are entitled to, then it should be a fair amount of com-
pensation but compensation should be received swiftly and
adequately-we should not be used as pawns to bring dif-
ferent companies to justice.
Thank you.
Mr. Asselta: I do thank you. Your points are well taken,
most appropriate and I appreciate you making them.
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Mr. Kreindler: Mrs. Flynn is also a Pan Am family mem-
ber. She would like to say something.
Mrs. Flynn: Good evening, I don't have to go up and say
anything there. I can see you. I'm also not a victim, but a
family member who has survived the Pan Am 103 tragedy.
This is my husband,Jack. Our sonJ.P. Flynn was ajunior at
Colgate University on his way home for Christmas vacation
on December 21, 1988. Mr. Kreindler didn't know I was
coming tonight, so my remarks are not prepared. I don't
have a prepared speech, so I speak from the heart, and, as
Mr. Kreindler mentioned, I have testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee with regard to the Montreal
Protocol.
My feeling is very simple about this. We need accounta-
bility. Pan Am 103 went down because something hap-
pened to that airline. There were all sorts of warnings.
Everybody knew that something was going to happen two
weeks prior to the bombing of Pan Am 103, and yet that
airline flew. And why did it fly? We don't know why it flew,
but we know now, because of the investigation, not only the
criminal investigation but the government investigation
also. And, as you know, no one has been brought to justice.
There are indictments out there, we haven't been able to
get our hands on anybody, and there certainly is a lot more
cover-up than we think as far as the criminal investigation is
concerned. But, what we finally know now is how that
bomb got on the plane, and what exactly happened, and we
also know that there was a whole aura around the bombing
of Pan Am 103 where people did not pay attention to the
warnings, where Pan Am knew that this was going to hap-
pen and yet the airline flew.
So what does that tell you? It tells you about accountabil-
ity. It tells you about those people who died on that airline
when it could have been prevented, and that is the tragedy
of this whole thing. We all live with this every day, and say
to ourselves, great, yes, the Pan Am case has been upheld.
But, what does that really mean? It means much more than
compensation, particularly as you all know, to a mother of a
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college student. What it means is that there is a moral
message being sent to corporations, and particularly, I
think, to the airlines, that you are not going to get away
with this anymore. This careless, cavalier attitude toward
aviation safety is not going to fly any more and that was ac-
complished so clearly by having delineated the problem in
a court system. That's what we are talking about here.
No one wants to wait five years for justice. We are going
to wait many years before the countries responsible for this
terrorist act are brought to justice, but there are a lot of
people responsible for this, and what you have to do is to
take each one of them and say who else is responsible?
Who else knew about those warnings, and didn't do any-
thing about it? There is a whole other layer there. We are
only into one part of that layer, and I would ask you to cer-
tainly congratulate Mr.Kreindler and all the people who
worked so hard for our families.
Thank you.
A Voice: All right, but I'm not making a speech.
Mr. Asselta: I will take you. I just want to make a couple
of observations. I notice we have several subjects for future
forums, accident investigation joint and several liability, go
ahead.
Mr. Ephraimson: I'm Hans Ephraimson and I have the
misfortune to be the chairman of the Families Committee
of Korean Airlines incident of September 1, '83 where 269
of our loved ones were blasted away by some Soviet fighter
bomber. I'm not going to go into the human problems we
have had over the last 11 years, nor am I going to go into
our still ongoing litigation, which is going to be reopened
by our very esteemed opponent George Tompkins in Judge
Robinson's court in Washington, D.C. But we have found
out in our incident that while we all retained attorneys to
represent us, and we all had a lot of questions on how this
incident could have occurred, that our attorneys, as valua-
ble and as valiant as they were to fight for our rights and as
successful as they were, really could not answer our ques-
tions. We as families had to start to make discovery pro-
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ceedings ourselves at our own expense and great amount of
work to answer and conduct the investigations Lee Krein-
dler is speaking of. I found myself in Moscow about a year
and a half ago in a state ceremony with President Yeltsin in
the Kremlin in order to receive the first documents which
the Russian government released to us. I personally, includ-
ing many of our family members, have spent thousands and
thousands of hours trying to find out what happened on
our flight, and, as George Tompkins said so rightly, we still
are not at the end of it.
So, the investigation of our attorneys, specifically regard-
ing the problems damages, gives us cause to respect them
greatly. Lee Kreindler is the best of his profession and I
think we all owe him an ovation for having been able to
produce willful misconduct both in the Korean Airline and
in the Pan American cases. We respect him greatly, but
what we need today, in a world which is not dominated by
the United States any more, is an international liability sys-
tem which is accessible to all American citizens wherever
they travel all over the world.
In our case, where we have 270 passengers, we only were
able to bring 109 lawsuits in the United States. Most of the
other passengers had to settle for the $75,000 limit. A few
passengers, twelve families, were able to bring lawsuits in
Japan, where the Japanese court has not, after 11 years, ad-
dressed the question of willful misconduct. Two cases re-
main pending in the courts of the Philippines.
So, the question is not that we have the American tort
system available to us; accidents happen outside of the
United States and outside of our tort system. We cannot
live without an international treaty that allows the five mil-
lion Americans living and working outside the United
States, many of whose families live in the United States, only
to have access to non-American law and non-American
courts. That's exactly what the Montreal Protocols address.
They allow American families and American travelers to ac-
cess American courts and the American system all over the
world wherever they travel.
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My question to Mr. Kreindler is, is he advocating that we
now denounce an international treaty and signal to the
world that we are going to be the arbiter of whether we
participate in treaties at our choice, thereby giving other
countries the possibility to denounce whatever treaties they
don't like, and which we would like to see enforced?
Mr. Kreindler: I guess the simple answer is yes. I would
like to see it denounced right away. The Warsaw Conven-
tion is not a United Nations treaty in any public sense, it is a
treaty that goes back to 1929, the year that Lindbergh flew
across the Atlantic. It has no public law significance whatso-
ever. It simply involves private law and the relationship be-
tween airline passengers and airlines. I most assuredly
would like to see it denounced immediately and I can't un-
derstand why it hasn't been already.
Mr. Ephraimson: Welcome to 1920, Mr. Kreindler.
Mr. Dean: I'm privileged to teach a course in interna-
tional law at Georgetown, and the Warsaw Convention is
primarily a private treaty. In fact the assertion it has no
public law features is incorrect; it does have public applica-
tions. The Warsaw Convention is a treaty that is essentially
now operating under ICAO oversight, which is a subsidiary
agency technically of the United Nations, although it
doesn't operate that way very often. So whether or not it is
a United Nations treaty is really kind of a fine point, not
very relevant, but I want to make one other point. What we
have seen here tonight, with respect to the people that have
been through the case, reminds me a little bit of an astron-
omer whose theory prevailed in the world for over 200
years, and his name was Ptolemy. He had a view of the
planets that perfectly explained the movement of the plan-
ets on the assumption that everything revolves around the
earth, and those of us who worked in the U.S. court system
have a Ptolemaic view of the universe. It doesn't work that
way. There are people we leave behind. The world does
not revolve around the Second Circuit, and certainly it
doesn't revolve around Washington.
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Mr. Asselta: Thank you. I'll take one more question if
anybody has one.
A Voice: One problem with the Warsaw Convention has
not been addressed, and that is the forum limiting provi-
sions. I think what everybody has been talking about are
really tort problems, and what you have with this Conven-
tion is a private treaty with a contractual overlay over a tort
problem.
Mr. Asselta: Let me ask Lee something: Has that been a
problem in any of your cases, the forum limitations of
Warsaw?
Mr. Kreindler: In Warsaw Convention cases it is definitely
a serious problem, But not in non-Warsaw Convention
cases. The Convention creates the problem.
Mr. Tompkins: One, there is an additional forum added
which would be the domicile of the passenger and that is a
good amendment but you cannot adopt just that part of
Montreal Protocol 3, you have to take the whole thing.
A Voice: You know, in tort cases you are allowed to bring
a case where the accident occurred. Yet, the Warsaw Con-
vention prohibits doing that. Why shouldn't you be able to
bring a cause of action where the accident occurred?
Mr. Tompkins: You would not want to do that in interna-
tional aviation. Think of the places you could be. Do you
want to bring your action in Thailand or Nepal?
A Voice: You have a case where an accident occurred
here. The ticket was bought in Iceland. Iceland Air has its
headquarters there. The flight is heading for an Iceland
destination, yet something happens here. You have a cause
of action. You are not allowed to bring it in this country.
Mr. Tompkins: Sure you are, if you bought the ticket
here. One feature of Montreal Protocol 3 is good, add the
domicile of the passengers to the available forums. I sup-
port that 100 percent. The problem is you cannot get that
alone.
A Voice: If the accident happened over Peru we would be
in Peruvian courts.
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Mr. Asselta: Excuse me, you may continue that wherever
you may wish. We do have to conclude this meeting at 8:00,
and it is 8:00 now.
I do thank everyone; particularly the panel. Warren,
thank you for coming here from Washington, George, and
Tom from coming a long distance, and Gary, now that I
recognize you. And, of course, Peter, I think they all de-
serve a nice round of applause.
Thank you very much.
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